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Environmental Law
by Travis M. Trimble*
In 2003 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
decided two cases concerning the Clean Air Act,1 holding that provisions
allowing the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to address
compliance issues through the issuance of administrative compliance
orders are unconstitutional2 and that the Clean Air Act does not waive
the United States’s defense of sovereign immunity in an action for
punitive penalties for past violations of air pollution laws.3 The court
also considered for the first time the circumstances under which a state
enforcement action would preempt a citizen suit under the Clean Water
Act.4 This Article also discusses a district court case that decides two
issues which have not yet been addressed by the Eleventh Circuit: (1)
whether and to what extent the Supreme Court’s decision in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers5 changed the definition of “navigable waters” under the Clean
Water Act and the Oil Pollution Act;6 and (2) what standards, if any,
apply to a government cleanup under the Oil Pollution Act for the
purpose of determining whether the cleanup costs were reasonable.7
This Article then discusses a district court case holding that a county
government was acting as a market participant in the solid waste
collection and disposal markets, and thus, its contract with a private
* Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Former Partner in the firm of
Anderson, Walker & Reichert, Macon, Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., 1986); University
of North Carolina – Chapel Hill (M.A., 1988); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D.,
1993).
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671a (2003).
2. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003).
3. City of Jacksonville v. Dep’t of the Navy, 348 F.3d 1307, 1320 (11th Cir. 2003).
4. McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (2001 & Supp. 2003).
5. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2001 & Supp. 2003).
7. United States v. Jones, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (M.D. Ga. 2003).
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waste hauler was not subject to review under the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution.8 Finally, this Article briefly reviews a
district court holding remanding an Army Corps of Engineers issuance
of a “Finding of No Significant Impact” under the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act9 in connection with a dam project in Alabama,10 and an
Eleventh Circuit decision awarding litigation costs to plaintiffs under the
Clean Water Act for fees paid to an expert for monitoring compliance
with a consent order.11
I. THE CLEAN AIR ACT
A. Constitutionality
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Whitman,12 the Eleventh Circuit
held unconstitutional those provisions of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) that
allow the EPA to address various alleged violations of the Act by issuing
an administrative compliance order (“ACO”).13 The court concluded
that under the plain language of the CAA, the EPA could issue an ACO
having the force and effect of law, with civil and criminal penalties
possible for noncompliance, without the affected party having an
opportunity to challenge judicially the substantive allegations of the
ACO.14 For these reasons, the ACO provisions violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.15
In this case, between 1982 and 1996, the Tennessee Valley Authority
(“TVA”) replaced boilers at nine of its coal-fired electrical power plants
without obtaining permits from the EPA. In 1999 the EPA contended
that these projects triggered New Source Review under the CAA and
that the TVA was required to have met New Source Performance
Standards (“NSPS”) for the replacement boilers.16 The TVA contended
that the projects constituted “routine maintenance” at the plants, which
was exempt from NSPS.17 The EPA issued an ACO, which required the
8. BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., Inc. v. Broward County, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (S.D. Fla.
2003); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2003).
10. Am. Canoe Ass’n v. White, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
11. Ga. Envtl. Org. v. Hankinson, 351 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2003).
12. 336 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2003).
13. Id. at 1260; Clean Air Act § 113(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1)(A) (2003); Clean Air
Act § 113(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2)(A) (2003); Clean Air Act § 113(a)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(a)(3)(B)(2003) [hereinafter “AOC provisions”].
14. 336 F.3d at 1258.
15. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. 336 F.3d at 1244.
17. Id.
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TVA to obtain permits for the projects and to bring the plants into
compliance with the NSPS. The TVA disputed the findings of the ACO
on several grounds. Subsequently, the EPA issued a notice to the TVA
that it would reconsider the ACO but directed the TVA to comply with
the ACO pending its reconsideration. The EPA undertook its reconsider-
ation by referring to the Environmental Appeals Board (“EAB”) for
adjudication of the issue of whether the TVA violated the CAA by
replacing the boilers in its plants without permits. The EAB, after a
hearing,18 affirmed most of the ACO, which directed the TVA to obtain
permits and comply with the NSPS at its plants that had undergone
boiler replacement. The TVA petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review
of the EPA’s notice of reconsideration, which referred the matter to the
EAB for adjudication and review of the EAB’s decision.19
The threshold issue before the court, and the one on which the case
turned, was whether the EAB decision affirming the ACO was a final
decision and therefore subject to judicial review.20 After analyzing the
ACO provisions in context with other enforcement actions available to
the EPA under the CAA and the statutory history of the Act itself, the
court concluded that Congress likely did not intend for an ACO to be a
final order.21 However, in looking to the “unambiguous language” of
the ACO provisions themselves,22 the court concluded that “Congress
established a scheme in which noncompliance with an ACO issued ‘on
the basis of any information available’ can lead to the imposition of
severe civil penalties and imprisonment—even if the EPA is incapable
of proving an act of illegal pollution in court.”23 The court noted that
under the statute, court review of an ACO was limited to two issues: (1)
whether the ACO was issued, and (2) whether the ACO was in fact
violated.24 Thus, a party receiving an ACO, such as the TVA, would
18. The EPA contended it set up this hearing because it could not sue the TVA, another
federal agency, and thus could not bring a judicial enforcement action to enforce the ACO.
In an earlier decision, the court rejected this contention. Id. at 1245 n.19 (citing Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. EPA, 278 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2002)). In any event, this hearing did not
satisfy the court that EPA had fulfilled its due process obligations. Id. at 1246. Among
other things, as the EPA admitted, the Clean Air Act does not provide for or contemplate
such an adjudication, and no regulations govern how such an adjudication is to be
conducted. Id. Further, the court recited a litany of due process problems with the hearing
as it was conducted, stating among other things that “the EAB and ALJ manufactured the
procedures they employed on the fly, entirely ignoring the concept of the rule of law.” Id.
19. Id. at 1244-46.
20. Id. at 1247-48.
21. Id. at 1252.
22. Id. at 1255.
23. Id. at 1256.
24. Id. at 1250, 1255.
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have no opportunity to challenge the substantive allegations of the order
in court.25
For this reason, the court held that “[t]he Clean Air Act is unconstitu-
tional to the extent that mere noncompliance with the terms of an ACO
can be the sole basis for the imposition of severe civil and criminal
penalties,” and therefore, “ACOs lack finality . . .,”26 depriving the court
of jurisdiction to review their validity.27 The court stated that for an
ACO to constitute a final agency action, “[t]he EPA must do what it
believes it has been required to do all along—namely, prove the
existence of a CAA violation in district court, including the alleged
violation that spurred the EPA to issue the ACO in this case.”28
B. Sovereign Immunity
In City of Jacksonville v. Department of the Navy,29 the Eleventh
Circuit held that the CAA did not waive the defense of sovereign
immunity available to the United States when the request for relief was
for punitive penalties for past, noncontinuing violations of state and local
pollution control laws enacted pursuant to the CAA.30
In this case, the City of Jacksonville sued the Navy in state court,
alleging that from 1996 through 2001, the Navy violated various state
and local air pollution laws enacted under the CAA. The City did not
allege any continuing violations but instead sought punitive penalties for
the past violations. The Navy answered with the defense of sovereign
immunity and removed the case to district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1).31 The City moved for remand, contending that the CAA
implicitly precluded removal. In the meantime, the Navy moved for
judgment on the pleadings as to its sovereign immunity defense. In
response, the City contended that the CAA waived the United States’s
sovereign immunity for punitive penalty actions. The district court held
that removal was proper and that the CAA did waive the Navy’s
25. Id. at 1255.
26. Id. at 1260. The court noted that the Clean Water Act shares an ACO-based
compliance scheme with the CAA, allowing ACOs to be issued on the basis of any
information available to the agency, with penalties for violations. See id. at 1255 n.32.
27. Id. at 1260. The court also stated that the statute could not be saved on an ad hoc
basis by the EPA voluntarily undertaking an adjudication prior to the issuance of an ACO.
Id. at 1259.
28. Id. at 1260.
29. 348 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2003).
30. Id. at 1319-20.
31. Id. at 1309; 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 2003). Section 1442(a)(1) provides
that any action brought against the United States or any agency thereof in a state court
may be removed to district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
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sovereign immunity defense.32 The Eleventh Circuit accepted the
Navy’s interlocutory appeal.33
The court first considered the City’s contention that the CAA implicitly
precluded the Navy’s removal of the state court case to district court and
held that it did not.34 The City based its contention on section 304-
(e)35 of the CAA, a subsection of the Act’s citizen suit provision.36 The
court noted that, in contrast to removal actions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441,37 there was no requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 144238 that Con-
gress “expressly override” a party’s right to remove an action for
Congress to preempt such removal.39 However, the court stated that
it was nevertheless required by precedent to find that Congress’s intent
to preclude such removal be “clear and manifest.”40 The court found no
clearly manifested congressional intent to preclude removal in either the
language of section 304(e) or in the legislative history of the CAA.41
The court also noted that a sovereign immunity defense was precisely
the kind of defense Congress intended the federal courts to resolve.42
Thus, the court held that the Navy’s removal was proper and not
precluded by the CAA.43
Next, the court held that the CAA did not waive the United States’s
sovereign immunity defense to actions for punitive penalties for past
violations of the Act.44 The court first noted, and the Navy conceded,
32. 348 F.3d at 1309.
33. Id. at 1309.
34. Id. at 1310-13.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2003). Section 304(e) provides in part that
nothing . . . in any . . . law of the United States shall be construed to prohibit,
exclude, or restrict any State, local, or interstate authority from (1) bringing any
enforcement action or obtaining any judicial remedy or sanction in any State or
local court . . . against the United States . . . under State or local law respecting
control and abatement of air pollution.
Id.
36. 348 F.3d at 1311.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 2003).
39. 348 F.3d at 1311.
40. Id. (citing Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988)).
41. Id. at 1311-12. The court also rejected the City’s argument that the presence of a
provision preserving removal of actions against the United States under the Clean Water
Act, and its absence in the CAA, implicated congressional intent that removal not be
available for cases brought under state or local air pollution laws. Id. at 1313. The court
stated that it must find “express affirmative support indicating that such is the intent of
Congress.” Id.
42. Id. at 1313.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1320.
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that the CAA did waive the sovereign immunity defense for continuing
violations under the federal facilities provision of the CAA.45 The
federal facilities provision provides that the federal government shall be
subject “to any process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State,
or local courts, or in any other manner. This subsection shall apply
notwithstanding any immunity of such agencies, officers, agents, or
employees under any law or rule of law . . . .”46 The City contended
that this provision waived the defense for punitive-penalty actions as
well.47 The court noted that while no court had addressed this issue
under the CAA, the Supreme Court in United States Department of
Energy v. Ohio48 addressed the issue under the Clean Water Act’s
federal facilities provision,49 which has language similar to that of the
CAA.50 There, the Court held that the CWA did not waive sovereign
immunity from punitive penalties.51 The court followed the Supreme
Court’s reasoning that the word “sanction” in the statute meant coercive
sanction only, “to the exclusion of punitive fines.”52
The court also rejected the City’s contention that the Act’s citizen suit
provision53 waived the defense.54 The court found that while certain
language in the provision constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity,
the waiver was not of greater extent than the waiver in the federal
facilities provision.55 The court concluded that because the CAA
contained no “affirmative and unequivocal waiver” of the sovereign
45. Id. at 1314; 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (2003).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a).
47. 348 F.3d at 1314.
48. 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2001).
50. City of Jacksonville, 348 F.3d at 1315-16.
51. Id. (citing United States Dep’t of Energy, 503 U.S. at 607).
52. Id. at 1316 (citing United States Dep’t of Energy, 503 U.S. at 623).
53. 42. U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2003). The Sixth Circuit accepted this argument in United
States v. Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board, 185 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 1999).
54. 348 F.3d at 1318.
55. Id. The relevant language in the CAA citizen suit provision provides that
[n]othing in . . . any . . . law of the United States shall be construed to prohibit,
exclude, or restrict any State, local, or interstate authority from (1) bringing any
enforcement action or obtaining any judicial remedy or sanction in any state or
local court . . . against the United States . . . under any State or local law
respecting control and abatement of air pollution.
Id. at 1317 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2000) (emphasis added)). In place of the words
“judicial remedy or sanction,” the CWA federal facilities provision construed in U.S. Dep’t
of Energy and the CAA federal facilities provision here, contained the words “process and
sanction.” See id.
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immunity defense to punitive-penalty actions, the district court’s grant
of the Navy’s motion for judgment on this issue was proper.56
II. CLEAN WATER ACT
A. State Enforcement Preemption of Citizen Suits
In McAbee v. City of Fort Payne,57 the Eleventh Circuit held that
portions of the Alabama Water Pollution Control Act (“AWPCA”)58 and
the Alabama Environmental Management Act (“AEMA”)59 were not
“comparable” to subsection 309(g) of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).60
Therefore, the acts did not preclude plaintiff ’s citizen suit alleging that
the City violated its National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(“NPDES”) permit,61 which authorized discharges from the City’s
wastewater treatment plant.62
The CWA’s citizen suit provision63 bars a citizen’s right to bring a
civil action seeking penalties under the provision for any alleged
violation
“with respect to which a State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting an action under State law comparable to [subsection
309(g)64, the administrative penalties subsection of the Clean Water
Act’s enforcement section,]”65 or “for which the Administrator, the
Secretary, or the State has issued a final order not subject to further
judicial review and the violator has paid a penalty assessed under this
subsection, or such comparable State law . . . .”66
At the time McAbee filed her complaint, defendant Fort Payne,
Alabama (the “City”), had already violated its NPDES permit on several
occasions and was operating under an administrative enforcement order
issued by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management
(“ADEM”). ADEM had fined the City $11,200 under the order. McAbee,
a landowner near the City’s plant, filed suit under the citizen suit
56. Id. at 1319.
57. 318 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003).
58. ALA. CODE §§ 22-22-1 to -14 (1997).
59. ALA. CODE §§ 22-22A-1 to -16 (1997).
60. 318 F.3d at 1257.
61. An NPDES permit authorizes and regulates the discharge of pollutants at a facility
pursuant to the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2001 & Supp. 2003).
62. 318 F.3d at 1256-57.
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2001 & Supp. 2003).
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2001).
65. Id. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii).
66. Id. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii).
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provision of the CWA, contending that the City’s permit violations were
continuing.67 The City moved for summary judgment, contending that
ADEM’s enforcement order and penalty constituted both a diligent
prosecution of an action and a final order with a penalty, both under
“comparable state law” to the CWA, so as to bar McAbee’s citizen suit.68
The district court ruled that the AWPCA and the AEMA were not
“comparable” to section 309(g) of the CWA, denied the City’s motion, and
certified an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.69 The issue of first impres-
sion before the Eleventh Circuit was whether Alabama’s laws were
comparable to subsection 309(g).70
In determining the correct standard to apply, the court first noted that
the language of the Act itself and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Act’s citizen suit provisions suggested that citizen suits were meant
to supplement, but not replace, state action in dealing with pollution.71
Therefore, a state law need only be sufficiently similar, not identical, to
subsection 309(g).72
Next, the court reviewed standards adopted by other circuits that had
considered the issue of comparability.73 In adopting its standard for
67. 318 F.3d at 1250.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1250-51.
70. Id. at 1252.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987)).
73. Id. at 1252-53. The court reviewed the First Circuit’s holding in North & South
Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1992); the Eighth
Circuit’s holding in Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th
Cir. 1994); the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Union Oil
Co., 83 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996); and the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Jones v. City of
Lakeland, 224 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2000).
In Town of Scituate, the First Circuit held that a state proceeds under comparable state
law against a party so as to bar citizen suits against the same party when: (1) the state
statutory scheme under which the state is acting contains penalty-assessment provisions
comparable to the Federal Act; (2) the state is authorized to assess those penalties; and (3)
the overall state statutory scheme seeks to correct the same violations that the CWA seeks
to correct. 949 F.2d at 556. The First Circuit concluded that it was not necessary that the
state actually assessed penalties as long as it had the authority to do so comparable to the
Clean Water Act. Id. Further, the court looked to the state’s overall statutory enforcement
scheme to determine whether public participation rights, including the right to intervene
in an action and the right to a hearing, were comparable. Id. at 556 n.7. The court looked
at state administrative law statutes and not just to the statute under which the state
actually prosecuted the enforcement action. Id.
The Eighth Circuit in Arkansas Wildlife Federation essentially adopted the First Circuit’s
test but added the requirement that state law, meaning the state’s overall statutory
scheme as in Town of Scituate, provide citizens a “meaningful opportunity to participate
at significant stages of the [administrative] decision-making process . . . .” 29 F.3d at 381.
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determining comparability in McAbee, the court held that it would
require “rough comparability” of the state’s law to the federal law
between each “class” of provisions contained in subsection 309(g) of the
CWA, i.e., penalty-assessment provisions, public-participation provisions,
and judicial review provisions.74 The court rejected as too “loose,” the
First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits’ approach of looking at the overall effect
of a state statutory scheme to determine whether a state’s enforcement
action under state law, for example, “ ‘seeks to remedy the same
violations as duplicative civilian action’” or whether state law “‘ade-
quately safeguarded the substantive interests of citizens in enforcement
actions.’”75 The court stated that its approach of comparing classes of
provisions was “easier to apply” than the “loose” standard, provided more
certainty for parties involved and for courts76 and also was supported
by legislative history.77 However, the court also did not explicitly
follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach of looking only at the statute under
which the state actually proceeded in its enforcement action. In fact, the
court left it somewhat unclear what the proper source of state law would
be as a basis of comparison to subsection 309(g) in future cases.78
Applying its standard to the facts of the case, the court held that while
the penalty-assessment provisions of Alabama law were comparable to
those of the CWA, the public-participation provisions were not.79
Specifically, the Clean Water Act requires the agency to give the public
The Ninth Circuit in Citizens for a Better Environment, adopted a more narrow standard
in assessing comparability. That court rejected the approach of looking at a state’s entire
statutory scheme to determine whether enforcement, including penalty provisions and
public participation provisions, was comparable, and instead looked only to the specific
statutory enforcement provision under which the state actually brought the action. 83 F.3d
at 1118. Further, the court held that the state must have actually assessed penalties in
order for the citizen suit bar to apply. Id.
The Sixth Circuit in Jones adopted a standard much like that of the First and Eighth
circuits, also looking to the state’s entire statutory scheme to determine whether it
contained public participation opportunities comparable to those of the Clean Water Act.
224 F.3d at 523-24.
74. 318 F.3d at 1255-56.
75. Id. at 1255 (quoting Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1255-56 (citing comments of Senator John Chafee, principal author and
sponsor of the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act).
78. See id. at 1254 n.8. The court stated that it “need not resolve this issue in the
present case” because the public-participation provisions of Alabama’s laws were not
comparable, whether or not the court looked only to the AWPCA and the AEMA or to those
statutes plus the Alabama Administrative Code. Id. The court considered the statutes and
the code for purposes of deciding the case. Id.
79. Id. at 1256. The court did not evaluate the judicial review provisions of the
respective laws.
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notice of and an opportunity to comment on a proposed penalty-
assessment action and notice of any hearing held concerning the
assessment to anyone who commented on the assessment.80 The Act
also provides that if no hearing is held before an assessment order is
issued, a commentor may petition the agency to set aside the order and
hold a hearing.81 In contrast, the Alabama scheme provided only ex
post facto notice to the public of an enforcement action with no right to
participate in pre-order proceedings.82 The Alabama scheme gave only
parties “aggrieved” by the order, as opposed to the general public, the
right to contest the order, and then only within fifteen days of the
publication of the post-order notice in a newspaper.83 The court held
that the provisions were not comparable to those of the Clean Water Act
and therefore the citizen suit bar did not apply to preclude McAbee’s
suit.84
B. Definition of Navigable Waters Under the Clean Water Act and
the Oil Pollution Act
In United States v. Jones,85 the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia considered the United States’s action for the
recovery of cleanup costs under the Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”)86 and for
penalties under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).87 The court held that
the government had proven the elements of its OPA cost-recovery action
and its CWA penalty action, including whether a discharge of oil into
“navigable waters” had occurred.88 More specifically, the court held
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”)89
did not narrow the definition of “navigable waters” so as to preclude the
government’s actions.90 The court also held that defendants would be
allowed to present evidence that the government’s OPA cleanup action
was inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan to determine the
amount the government was entitled to recover.91
80. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4)(B) (2001)).
81. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4)(C)).
82. Id. at 1257.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 267 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (M.D. Ga. 2003).
86. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2001 & Supp. 2003).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (2001).
88. 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1364.
89. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
90. 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.
91. Id. at 1363.
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Defendants in the case were Bay Street Corporation, GC Quality
Lubricants, Inc., Georgia-Carolina Oil Company, and Jones, respectively,
a holding company, two subsidiaries, and the chief officer and majority
shareholder of the companies, collectively owning and operating an oil
distributor in Macon, Georgia. During an inspection of defendants’
facility, EPA investigators discovered pooled oil and traced oil runoff
from the facility into a ditch that emptied into a creek and wetland
adjacent to the Ocmulgee River. The EPA ordered Jones to remove the
contamination, and he deferred to the EPA to conduct the cleanup. The
EPA spent over $2.5 million on the cleanup. The United States then
brought the action in three counts: cost recovery for the cleanup under
the OPA, penalties under the Clean Water Act for discharge of pollut-
ants into navigable waters, and penalties under the Clean Water Act for
failing to have an adequate Spill Prevention Control and Countermea-
sures (SPCC) plan at the facility. The United States moved for
summary judgment on its claims.92
The court first considered the United States’s claim for cost recovery
under the OPA.93 The court found that the corporate defendants were
responsible parties under the OPA as owners and operators of the
facility and that Jones individually was liable as an operator.94
The court next addressed the government’s claim that the discharges
from the facility into the drainage ditch constituted discharges in to
“navigable water,”95 an essential element of both the OPA cost-recovery
action96 and the CWA penalty count.97 The defendants contended that
the government could not prove the ditch actually led to the Ocmulgee
92. Id. at 1352-53.
93. Id. at 1353. Liability under the OPA comprises four elements: (1) a responsible
party; (2) a vessel or facility; (3) a discharge of oil into or upon navigable waters or
adjoining shorelines; and (4) removal costs and damages. Id.
94. Id. at 1356. Responsible parties are defined in OPA as persons owning or operating
the facility. The corporate defendants admitted to owning and operating the facility in
question. See id. at 1353-54. With respect to Jones individually, the court, applying
CERCLA case law, found that issues of fact remained regarding whether the corporate veil
could be pierced so as to hold him responsible as an owner. Id. at 1355. However, the
court followed a Seventh Circuit decision in holding that because Jones directed the
facility’s activities generally and because Jones was the “primary decision maker” over the
facility’s regulatory compliance, he was liable as an operator. Id. at 1355-56 (citing
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 1999) and on remand at
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 2000 WL 1716330 (N.D. Ill. 2000)).
95. Id. at 1356-57. The court held there was not a dispute that discharges to the ditch
eventually ended up in the Ocmulgee River, which itself is “undeniably a navigable water.”
Id. at 1357.
96. See id. at 1361.
97. Id.
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River, a navigable waterway.98 The court pointed to an analogous
Eleventh Circuit decision in a 1996 case, United States v. Eidson,99
which held that a defendant’s discharges in to a storm drainage ditch
that emptied into a canal and then into the Tampa Bay were discharges
in to navigable waters for purposes of the CWA.100 The Eleventh
Circuit in Eidson relied on well-settled case law and broadly construed
navigable waters, as defined in the CWA, to include non-navigable
tributaries to navigable waters.101 At issue in defendant’s contention
was the extent to which the Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC
narrowed that definition.102
After reviewing various court decisions interpreting the reach of
SWANCC,103 the district court declined to follow courts interpreting
the holding in SWANCC to mean that navigable waters under the CWA
and the OPA only included “actually navigable” waterways.104 Instead,
the court followed the Ninth Circuit’s more narrow reading of SWANCC,
which excludes only “isolated waters” from the definition of navigable
waters, not waters somehow connected to navigable waters,105 and held
that the decision in SWANCC “did not serve to limit the [Clean Water
Act] as narrowly as Defendants contend here.”106 The court deter-
mined that the decision in SWANCC had not affected the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Eidson, and under Eidson, defendants’ discharge
into a ditch that eventually led to the Ocmulgee River constituted a
discharge in to navigable waters under the OPA and CWA.107
The court also found that the United States had met its burden on the
other elements of its OPA cost-recovery claim except with respect to the
amount it was entitled to recover (discussed below), its penalty claims
98. Id. at 1357. The court addressed defendants’ implied argument that because the
ditch itself was a non-navigable waterway, discharges in to it did not violate the OPA or
the CWA. Id.
99. 108 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 1997).
100. Id. at 1341.
101. Jones, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (citing Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1358-60. The court noted that some courts, e.g., F.D. & P. Enter., Inc. v.
United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 2003), have read
SWANCC to substantially narrow the definition of “navigable water” under the CWA to
waters which are actually navigable or have a “substantial nexus beyond a mere
hydrological connection” to actually navigable waters. Jones, 267 F. Supp. at 1359.
104. Id. at 1360, 1359 n.7.
105. Id. at 1360 (referring to Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526
(9th Cir. 2001)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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for discharge in to navigable waters, and its claim that defendants failed
to maintain a proper SPCC plan under the Clean Water Act.108
In addressing the amount of recovery to which the United States was
entitled under its OPA claim, the court reached an interesting conclusion
regarding defendants’ affirmative defense that the government’s
expenditures on remediation were inconsistent with the National
Contingency Plan (“NCP”).109 Defendants contended that the govern-
ment failed to follow several NCP regulations in carrying out the
remediation action.110 The court noted that while the government’s
cost-recovery actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”)111 are limited to costs
“not inconsistent with the national contingency plan,”112 there is no
such limitation on costs that the government may recover under the
OPA.113 Therefore, the court found that defendants “cannot limit the
government’s recovery of costs [under the OPA] merely by showing that
its actions were inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan.”114
However, the court went on to state that the government did not have
“unlimited power to recover any costs” under the OPA.115 The court
found that the government’s expenditures were limited by the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act to those which were not arbitrary or capri-
cious.116 The court added that a plaintiff claiming that an agency’s
decision was arbitrary or capricious must show that the decision was
either “not based on a consideration of the relevant factors or amounted
to a clear error of judgment.”117 Based on this standard, the court held
108. Id. at 1360-62.
109. Id. at 1362. The National Contingency Plan, authorized at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)
(2001) and revised and republished under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1995 & Supp. 2003),
provides for a regulatory scheme governing remedial actions under the Clean Water Act
and CERCLA. For example, CERCLA provides that “[t]he plan shall specify procedures,
techniques, materials, equipment and methods to be employed in identifying, removing, or
remedying releases of hazardous substances . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (1995). The Plan
is published at 40 C.F.R. Part 300.
110. 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-63.
111. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1995 & Supp. 2003).
112. 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (citing CERCLA at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1995)).
113. Id. (citing OPA at 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(1)(A) (2001)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1996) and
United States v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 172 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1999) for the rule
that the government’s expenditures could not be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion).
117. Id. (citing Ward v. Campbell, 610 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1980), which reviewed a
decision of the Civil Service Commission to downgrade the plaintiff employees to a lower
pay class).
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that the defendants’ contention that the government’s removal action
was inconsistent with several NCP regulations amounted to contention
that “the government’s removal methods amounted to a clear error of
judgment and, therefore, were arbitrary and capricious.”118
The court’s ruling on this issue seemingly amounts to a holding that
the NCP can provide the “relevant factors” for determining whether a
government removal action under the OPA was carried out arbitrarily
or capriciously for the purposes of the government’s OPA cost-recovery
action.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc. v. Broward County,119
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
considered whether contracts that Broward County, Florida (“the
County”) entered into with BFI, a private waste hauler, were invalid
restrictions on interstate commerce.120 The court previously had held
that similar contracts were an unconstitutional restriction on interstate
commerce.121 In this case, however, the court held that the contracts
were not unconstitutional restrictions, concluding that the County
entered into the contracts as a market participant in the solid waste
collection and disposal markets, and as such, its contracts were exempt
from constitutional scrutiny.122
In 1986 the County and several municipalities within the county
entered into an interlocal agreement for waste disposal. Pursuant to
this agreement, the County enacted an ordinance under which, among
other things, the County assumed the obligation to provide for disposal
of all solid waste generated in the county and in the municipalities that
were parties to the interlocal agreement. The County met its obligation
by contracting with a private company to construct and operate resource
recovery facilities (incinerators) in the County. This contract called for
the County to deliver a minimum tonnage of solid waste to the facilities
and to pay a fee if the minimum was not met. Thus, to ensure the
minimum would be met, the parties to the interlocal agreement,
including the County, enacted flow-control ordinances, which required
solid waste haulers doing business in the respective areas covered by the
agreement to deliver their collected waste to the County-funded
118. Id. at 1363-64.
119. 265 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
120. Id. at 1338.
121. Id. at 1336 (citing Coastal Carting, Ltd. v. Broward County, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1350
(S.D. Fla. 1999)).
122. Id. at 1346.
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facilities. The interlocal agreement also required the governments to
include a provision requiring the haulers to deliver waste to the County
facilities in their own waste collection contracts with private waste
haulers. In both instances, waste haulers paid the county a “tipping
fee,” or a per ton fee to dispose of waste at the facilities.123
In 1996 the County entered into a waste collection contract with BFI’s
predecessor, which gave BFI, as successor, an exclusive right to collect
residential solid waste and a nonexclusive right to collect commercial
solid waste in a part of the unincorporated county.124 The contract
contained a “designation clause,” which provided that “[BFI] must
deliver such solid waste to a Designated Disposal Facility or Facilities
as directed by the Contract Administrator in writing and shall pay any
County fees or charges established for the use thereof.”125
In 1999 the district court ruled in Coastal Carting Ltd. v. Broward
County126 that the County’s flow-control ordinance violated the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution because it discriminated
against out-of-state waste disposal service providers in favor of the
County’s facilities.127 Because of the decision in Coastal Carting, the
County amended its flow-control ordinance to allow a waste hauler,
otherwise obligated by the ordinance to deliver waste to the County
facilities, to deliver it to out-of-state facilities under certain circumstanc-
es.128 After this decision, BFI informed the County that it wished to
dispose of waste collected in the county at out-of-state facilities that
charged smaller tipping fees than BFI was required by its contract to
pay at the County facilities. The County responded that, notwithstand-
ing amendments to the flow-control ordinance adopted to make the
ordinance comply with the court’s decision, BFI was contractually
obligated to deliver its waste to the County facilities.129
BFI filed suit against the County seeking, among other things, a
declaration that the County’s post-Coastal Carting amendments to its
flow-control ordinances effectively amended the designation clause of
BFI’s contract, allowing it to haul waste to out-of-state facilities.
Therefore the County was violating the Commerce Clause and breaching
its contract with BFI by refusing to allow BFI to haul waste to out-of-
state facilities. The County answered that the amended ordinance did
123. Id. at 1334-36.
124. Id. at 1337.
125. Id.
126. 75 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
127. Id. at 1357.
128. 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1336-37.
129. Id. at 1338.
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not amend the contract. The County also claimed that the designation
clause did not constitute regulation of interstate commerce because the
County was acting as a market participant in the waste collection and
disposal markets and was therefore exempt from complying with the
Commerce Clause.130
In analyzing the issue, the court first reviewed the restriction that the
“dormant” Commerce Clause places on state action.131 The court then
noted the “market-participant” exception to this restriction, which
applies when a state or local government acts as a market participant
rather than a market regulator.132 The court identified what it
considered the central issue in various Supreme Court holdings
regarding whether the market-participant exception would apply even
when the government had entered into a private market; i.e., whether
the government was using its power, through contract or otherwise, in
one market to regulate other markets in which it was not participat-
ing.133 For example, in South Central Timber Developers, Inc. v.
Wunnicke,134 a case on which BFI relied, the Supreme Court held that
the state of Alaska’s requirement that contracts for the sale of state-
owned timber include a provision requiring the timber to be processed
in the state before shipment out of state violated the Commerce Clause
because Alaska was participating in the timber-sale market but not the
timber processing market.135 BFI argued that, like Alaska, the County
was using its contracts in the waste collection market to regulate the
waste disposal market, a market in which it did not participate.136
The court rejected this argument.137 The court distinguished BFI’s
case from South-Central Timber and instead followed the Second
Circuit’s holding in SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown.138 Like the
County, the government in SSC Corp. contracted out its waste disposal
obligations to a company to operate an incinerator.139 Also, the
government had pursued a two-part scheme to ensure a sufficient
volume of waste at the incinerator: (1) a flow-control ordinance and (2)
130. Id. at 1338-39.
131. Id. at 1339-41.
132. Id. at 1340.
133. Id. at 1340-41. In particular, the court compared White v. Massachusetts Council
of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983), with South Central Timber
Developers, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). Id.
134. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
135. 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1341 (citing Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 97-98).
136. Id. at 1342.
137. Id. at 1343.
138. Id.; 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995).
139. 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.
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a designation clause in its own contracts with waste haulers.140 The
Second Circuit held that the ordinance was unconstitutional, but upheld
the contracts, finding that “to the extent that Smithtown was expending
public funds and entering into contracts for solid waste collection and
disposal services, it was a participant in both of those distinct mar-
kets.”141 The court in BFI found that like the government in SSC
Corp. and unlike the state of Alaska, the County, through its contract
with another contractor to operate the waste disposal facilities, was a
participant in the waste disposal market and thus participated in both
the collection and disposal markets.142 The court therefore held that
the designation clause in the County’s contract with BFI, requiring BFI
to send waste it collected pursuant to the contract to the County’s
facilities (operated by another contractor to the County), was exempt
from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.143
IV. OTHER CASES
A. Expert Fees Under the Clean Water Act
The Eleventh Circuit considered an issue of first impression in Georgia
Environmental Organization, Inc. v. Hankinson.144 This case was an
appeal from an award of attorney fees and costs under the Clean Water
Act’s citizen suit provision.145 The court held that plaintiffs were
entitled to recover fees they paid to an expert who assisted in monitoring
the EPA’s compliance with a consent order, notwithstanding the fact
that the expert did not actually testify or otherwise directly participate
in the lawsuit itself.146 The court followed the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council,147 a Clean Air
Act fee-shifting case involving costs of monitoring the consent decree,
where the Supreme Court reasoned that “measures necessary to enforce
the remedy ordered by the District Court cannot be divorced from the
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1343.
142. Id. at 1345.
143. Id. In a related holding, the court also held that the amended flow-control
ordinance did not effectively amend BFI’s contract to include its post-Coastal Carting
terms, in part because the court read the ordinance to affect only future contracts, not
existing ones, and also because BFI’s contract with the county contained a provision
prohibiting any amendment except in writing signed by the parties. See id. at 1345-46.
144. 351 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2003).
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2001 & Supp. 2003).
146. 351 F.3d at 1364.
147. 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
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matters upon which the [plaintiffs] prevailed in securing the consent
decree.”148 The Eleventh Circuit went on to state:
protection of the rights enshrined in the consent decree depends upon
highly technical, post-judgment monitoring and evaluation of discharge
levels, including the intricacies of pollution movement through various
water bodies and associated sediment. Given the absence of a hearing
at which an expert could testify and the importance of his work to the
enforcement of the consent decree, we cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion by determining that the plaintiffs were entitled
to expert witness fees.149
B. National Environmental Policy Act—Finding of No Significant
Impact
In American Canoe Ass’n v. White,150 the district court vacated a
Clean Water Act § 404 permit issued to the Cullman-Morgan [counties,
Alabama] Water District for construction of a dam on the Duck River in
northeastern Alabama.151 The court also remanded to the Corps of
Engineers its Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”) in connection
with the project, instead of an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”),
for further consideration by the agency.152 Applying the standards to
determine whether an agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS was
arbitrary and capricious set out by the Eleventh Circuit in Hill v.
Boy,153 the court determined that the Corps had failed to take a “hard
look” at the cumulative impacts of the project on the future water
quality of the proposed reservoir and at the downstream effects of the
dam.154 The court also determined that even if the Corps did take a
hard look at these factors, it did not make a “convincing case” for issuing
a FONSI.155 For these reasons, the court held that the Corps’ issuance
of the FONSI was arbitrary and capricious, and the court vacated the
permit and remanded to the Corps for further proceedings.156
148. 351 F.3d at 1364.
149. Id.
150. 277 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
151. Id. at 1266.
152. Id. at 1265-66.
153. 144 F.3d 1446, 1450 (11th Cir. 1998).
154. 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
155. Id.
156. Id.
